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Section 4 - Appendix
on arms sales to China
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The UK imposed an embargo on the sale of "weapons and equipment
that could be used for internal repression" to China. [June
1989]
The European Embargo was introduced in 1989 after the Tiananmen
Square massacre. As Robin Cook said during questioning by the Defence
Select Committee on 30 January 2001 it served two purposes:- "The
first was a very clear international public expression of displeasure
at what China had done and, secondly anxiety to try and make sure
that arms of repression which might contribute to that type of event
should not be available from European countries".
It was never a defined embargo and was left to national interpretation.
The UK chose to interpret this as [approximately] non-lethal military
items.
The US General Accounting Office Study of 1998 suggests that some
EU countries have a ban on all military list items. Robin Cook disagreed
"we resist more than most of our other partner states."[30
January 2001] Peter Hain, as Foreign Office minister, told the Quadripartite
Committee on Strategic Export Controls May 2000 that the UK does
not know what the other EU member states have been selling to China.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, [SIPRI], records
UK, France, and Italy as EU suppliers of arms to China in its 2001
yearbook.
The Defence Select Committee of March 2001 calls on the UK Government
"July 2000 we recommend consideration of a stricter interpretation
of the arms embargo on China than that currently operated by the
UK. If it is now the case that other EU nations are relaxing their
interpretation of the 1989 embargo, that lends force to the need
for a common interpretation"
In January 2000 the Government gave a clear message on their view
of the Embargo when General Chi Haotian who commanded the troops
in the Tiananmen Square massacre and is now Defence Minister was
a guest of the Ministry Of Defence, and met John Prescott and Geoffrey
Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence.
The value of arms sales to China has gone up year by year. For example
£42 million in 1999, £51.5 million in 2000 [Strategic Export Controls
Annual Reports].
The whole trade would appear to be against some of the criteria
of The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria
[26 October 2000]…
for example
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| Criterion 2 |
'The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country
of final destination…The Government will not issue a licence if there
is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal
repression…the Government will exercise special caution and vigilance
in issuing licences where serious violations of human rights have
been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council Of
Europe or the EU.' |
| Criterion 3 |
'The Government will not issue licences for exports which would...aggravate
existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination'. |
| Criterion 4 |
'The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear
risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export...to
assert by force a territorial claim. When considering these risks
the Government will take into account inter alia: c] whether the equipment
would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national
security and defence of the recipient'. |
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Whether the UK defines the Peoples Liberation Army as being 'present'
in Tibet or 'in occupation', the reality is that the PLA is the
basis for the oppression of Tibetans. Any supply of military components
to China aids the internal repression.
The number of deployed PLA has reduced as China begins the process
of replacing men with more sophisticated weapons, but 400,000 are
still deployed in the West and South West zones that cover several
areas including historical Tibet [International Institute for Strategic
Studies- Military Balance 2001-2002].
Mark Pythian says in his 2000 book "The Politics of British Arms
Sales since 1964 " -'Arms sales are politically significant because
they serve as an expression of approval of the recipient country.
While a supplier may not regard the supply of arms as conferring
approval, recipients clearly do.'
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But in the case of UK exports to China,
the UK intent is made clear by the Following;
On 6 November 2000 Norman Baker asked the Secretary Of State For
Defence Geoff Hoon the purpose of three visits by representatives
of the Chinese Armed Forces between May and June of that year. The
reply was 'All of these visits were part of our wider efforts to
develop a substantive defence relationship with China through regular
balanced and reciprocal engagement in order to promote confidence-building
and dispel mistrust'.
To quote Mark Pythian again 'Once arms deals are concluded, they
leave the supplier government vulnerable to cancellation or delays
in the order until it is complete. This restricts the supplier government's
room for manoeuvre in terms of criticising the activities of the recipient
state...hence the threshold for diplomatic expressions of displeasure
and reaction is raised, generally dictating low-level responses to
excesses perpetrated by purchasers.'
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In these circumstances [ i.e. the above
clauses ] how can arms dealing be considered as part of a process
of dialogue professed to improve human rights?
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the UK Government |
